It has been held that the level of our civilization precludes imposition of the death penalty ivithout an individualized judgment that it is "appropriate".' Thus, "in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.", 2 It follows that capital sentencing procedures must "allow consideration of particularized mitigating factors," for [a] process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death. 4 Death sentences are imposed in Texas whenever a jury determines that the defendant (a) was convicted of a capital crime committed deliberately and unreasonably (in view of any provocation) and (b) is dangerous. 5 In Jurek v. Texas, 6 the United * Associate Professor, Rutgers University School of Law at Newark. Research assistance was provided by Norman Epting, a second year student at Rutgers-Newark School of Law. 'Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) . (Powell, Stevens & Stewart, J. J., plurality opinion). 2 id.
3 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272 (1976) . 4 428 U.S. at 304. 5 (b) ... the court shall submit the following issues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of this sentencing scheme. The Court could not approve a scheme, which sent to death all persons guilty of deliberate and unreasonable capital crimes. (Indeed, it is arguable that all contemporary capital crimes, by Texas' definition or any other, are deliberate and unreasonable.) 7 Furthermore, in a society which, by the use of an insanity defense, protects many of its most dangerous members even from judgments implying blameworthiness, the Court apparently could not rule that the finding of dangerousness necessarily took sufficient account of "the character and record of the offender" 8 to qualify as an individuating judgment that the death penalty was "appropriate. " 9 It was able, however, to uphold the Texas statute on the theory that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had construed the dangerousness question such that the defendant could bring to the jury's attention whatever mitigating circumstances he could show. The Court recognized that:
In determining the likelihood that the defendant would be a continuing threat to society, the jury could consider whether the defendant had a significant criminal record. It could consider the range and severity of his prior criminal conduct. It could further look to the age of the defendant and whether or not at the time of the commission of the offense he was acting under duress or under the domination of another. It could also consider whether the defendant was under an extreme form of mental or emotional pressure, something less, perhaps, than insanity, but more than the emotions of the average man, however inflamed, could withstand.'o of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased....
(f) If the jury returns an affirmative finding on each issue submitted under this article, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1978) .
6 428 U.S. 262. 7 See BLACK, CAPrITAL PUNISHMENT: Tl-E INEVI rA-BI.rrY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 57-62 (1974 The determination of dangerousness therefore developed a mixed use: it was to satisfy the legislative requirement that only dangerous offenders be executed, and it was to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the sentencing decision involve "consideration of particularized mitigating.circumstances."" Since the jury is to consider "whatever mitigating circumstances [the defendant] may be able to show, ' 1 2 we must assume that it may act upon mitigating evidence which is neutral or positive on the question of future dangerousness. To assert the contrary, one must be willing in effect to preclude individualized judgments and to preordain execution of any capital offender who does not appear innocuous. 13 There is an irresistible speculation that the mixed use is forced and that only a forthright granting of authority to preclude execution on the basis of mitigating evidence will meet the constitutional need. Nonetheless, if the Jurek Court's refusal to approve the Texas statute on its face and its commitment to particularized capital sentencing judgments are to have meaning, we must assume that the dangerousness determination affords flexibility. We must assume that dangerousness is a relative concept, better understood perhaps by the phrase "intolerable threat," so that mitigating evidence might lead a jury to find the risk of declining to execute acceptable to a humane and advanced society.
14 If this flexibility is necessary to the constitutionality of the statute, there is danger in any practice which inhibits the jury from voting consistently with its ethical and social judgment. The delegation to psychiatric experts of the function of determining dangerousness is such a practice. and that his patierns of conduct would be the same in the future as they had been in the past."' 
20
In Shippy the psychiatric expert was unable to assert "a reasonable medical probability" of dangerousness. 556 S.W.2d at 256. However, in Moore, the defendant was termed "an absolute threat," 542 S.W.2d at 676; in Livingston the testimony was that the defendant "would remain a continuing threat to society," 542 S.W.2d at 661; and in Gholson the experts' conclusion was that both defendants "would continue to be a danger to society," 542 S.W.2d at 399. S.W.2d at 65). Hovila's death sentence was affirmed despite the trial judge's refusal to permit his mother to testify that after his mistaken release from custody pending trial he had returned to her home and had stayed out of trouble and that four days later "when he discovered his release was a mistake he returned to Dallas with the intention of surrendering to the authorities." Id.
The evidence ... that Hovila did not murder or commit other criminal acts during a four-day period would not show that he probably would or would not be a continuing threat to society-the trial court's error, if any, in refusing to admit this evidence was not so harmful as to require us to reverse. Id. at 10. [Vol. 69 PEGGY C DA VIS dence supporting a death sentence is constitutionally required. The Court of Criminal Appeals has declined to -refine the rather vague statutory language setting forth the concept of dangerousness. Instead, the jury is typically asked to determine "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.
' 32 For instance, in King v. Statess the court was asked to set aside a death sentence for the trial judge's refusal to define the terms "deliberately," "probability," "'criminal acts of violence," and "continuing threat to society." ' ' The court noted that "the definition of common terms and phrases" is not required in a charge to the jury and that " [i] need not provide special definitions for these terms in its charge to the jury during the punishment stage of a capital murder trial. ' ' a6 The court had held similarly with regard to the term "probability" and defined it as follows:
"Likelihood" is one of the definitions for "probability" in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 2d Ed. (1948) . Other definitions of the word probability include "reasonable ground for presuming," "true, real, or likely to occur," "a conclusion that is not proof but follows logically from such evidence as is available," [and] "in the doctrine of chance, the likelihood of the occurrence of any particular form of an event."37 3 Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d at 117 n.6. The failure to iarrow these terms presents independent constitutional problems. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted that "when a determination of 'dangerousness' will result in a deprivation of liberty, no court can afford to ignore the very real constitutional problems surrounding incarceration predicated only upon a supposed propensity to commit criminal acts." Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (emphasis added). The court found it necessary to'
Relying upon the Kingjudgment that the language of the statute is "simple" and uses terms the jury is "supposed to know, ' 38 the Texas court has held that the defense has no right to inform its judgment regarding the use of peremptory challenges by asking prospective jurors such questions as whether they would deem a crime against property an "act of violence., 39 The jury which must decide the dangerousness question, and with it the fate of the capital defendant, is purged of individuals unable to swear that "the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not affect [their] deliberations on any issue of fact."° It is, then, to a jury sworn to dispassionate objectivity that the medical expert presents testimony that the defendant is a sociopath and the ominous conclusion that he will "constitute a continuing threat to society."
This expert testimony is suspect on three grounds. First, mental health professionals are notoriously bad at predicting dangerousness and invariably err on the side of overinclusion.
5 Alconstrue a statute requiring commitment of dangerous sex offenders to "provide an analytical framework to guide lower courts in applying the conclusory term 'dangerous to others'." For, [w] ithout some such framework, "dangerous" could readily become a term of art describing anyone whom we would, all things considered, prefer not to encounter on the streets. We did not suppose that Congress had used "dangerous" in any such Pickwickian sense. Rather, we supposed that Congress intended the courts to refine the unavoidably vague concept of "dangerousness" on a case-by-case basis, in the traditional common-law fashion. Ia at 1099. 38 though it has seemed a necessity in the maintenance of a system of involuntary mental health care, and a reasonable incident to the multidimensional process of making sen tencing decisions in non-capital cases, psychiatric prediction of dangerousness is conceded to be highly unreliable by virtually every student of the problem. And, while the point has been made frequently and conclusively, the concessions of several mental health professionals bear repeating. It is admitted that "the longer one works in [the mental health]"field, the more one is impressed with the problem of deciding the question of danger. ... ,,42
It is also conceded that:
We cannot predict even with reasonable certainty that an individual will be dangerous to himself or to others. 148, 151 (1976) . 46 The terms sociopath, psychopath and antisocial personality are used interchangeably in psychiatric and psyversial and perhaps the least precise in psychiatric nomenclature.
The term "psychopath" is probably the most abused word in the whole psychiatric vocabulary. Etymologically, the word itself is nonspecific; it merely means a sick mind. Such ambiguous terms are readily subject to misuse. When a vague term is employed, it usually means that the concept which it represents is vague, and, unfortunately, this is true of psychopathy.
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There are some who think the term without scientific meaning and many who think it excessively and irresponsibly used. 49 The following characteristics were identified by Cleckley and are, with chological journals and will here be deemed to have the same referent. PSYCH. 199, 200 (1973) . Cf W. McCORD &J. MCCORD, supra note 48, at 44, on the problem of diagnosis ("the observer should possess more than the usual amount of knowledge of his patient; he cannot depend, as with many other disorders, on the overt behavior symptoms, or complaints of the subject at the time of contact").
5 Psychological testing of adolescent delinquents and volunteers (ministers, psychologists, social workers, correction officers, psychiatric residents and graduate students) in a mental health collective identified more than fifty percent of each group as psychopathic. Hawk & Peter- 152-83 (1971) . freedom from object relations" which serves as "a defense against the intolerable experience of helplessness."
5 Nevertheless, no explanation of the convergence of symptoms has won a concensus. In sum, the diagnosis tells us little more than that a subject exhibits, for unknown reasons, a cluster of characteristics which may or may not suggest an identifiable intrapsychic dynamic. The third difficulty involved in the use of psychiatric testimony indicating that a Texas capital defendant is a sociopath is that despite the fact that the criminal or antisocial conduct is seen as an identifying symptom of sociopathy, there is, surprisingly, no reason to hope that pyschiatric predictions of dangerousness will be significantly more reliable within the universe of persons diagnosed as sociopaths. Whether because the diagnosis is meaningless, 6 0 or difficult to make, A search of the literature reveals only one study of the dangerousness of severe sociopaths. All of the sociopaths in this study had been convicted of at least one crime, and all had been diagnosed primary psychopaths. One quarter were convicted of no additional crimes during a fifteen year followup:
For some 15 years we ... have followed the subsequent convictions of 70 prisoners ... who were picked out as undoubted examples of psychopathic personality of a severe grade. We have compared them with nonpsychopathic prisoners. Although most of them have became very serious recidivists and have been in prison for much of the time, a quarter of them, to our surprise, have never been reconvicted. In the last 5 years of the 15 follow-up, just completed, the psychopaths who have been at liberty during this period have hardly been reconvicted more often than a control group. 6 3
The ability of psychiatrists to predict serious assaultive crimes among offenders who had committed at least one criminal act and fit identical with the "classical stereotype of the criminal or antisocial psychopath," ' has been tested in an effort in Massachusetts to identify and treat dangerous sex offenders.65 Of the thirty patients found to be dangerous after thirty months of treatment and evaluation," less than thirty percent committed serious assaultive crimes. If psychiatric experts in Texas capital sentencing proceedings believe, as they seem to,6 that all "severe" sociopaths are dangerous, they may, then, overpredict simple recidivism in one out of four cases. If they were to conduct extensive analyses, trait independent, to a considerable degree, of the other manifestations which we regard as fundamental. H. CLECKLEY. supra note 50, at 290. The task of identifying an independent pathologic trait leading to violent behavior may be no easier when the subject is a diagnosed sociopath than when he is not. and they do not,69 they might overpredict serious assaultive behavior by as much as seventy percent. Yet, their pronouncement that there is a probability that the defendant will commit future acts of violence because he is a sociopath must skew the sentencing process away from a balancing judgment reflecting contemporary morality and toward a rigid process of classification. Analogous conflicts between the factfinder's tendency to label at the direction of psychiatric experts and its duty to make an independent judgment are instructive.
LESSONS FROM ANALOGOUS USES OF PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE
The moral, social and legal judgment made by a jury deciding the appropriateness of a death sentence is much like that of a jury deciding the culpability of a defendant who raises an insanity defense. Here too the psychiatric expert may inhibit jury deliberation:
With the relevant information about the defendant, and guided by the legal principles enunciated by the court, the jury must decide, in effect, whether or not the defendant is blameworthy. Undoubtedly, the decision is often painfully difficult, and perhaps its very difficulty accounts for the readiness with which we have encouraged the expert to decide the question. But our society has chosen not to give this decision to psychiatrists or to any other professional elite but rather to twelve lay representatives of the community.
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It has been determined that "in view of the complicated nature of the decision to be made-intertwining moral, legal and medical judgments-the insanity defense is peculiarly apt for resolution by the jury." 71 And, .it has been required "that trial judges and appellate judges ensure that the jury base its decision on the behavioral data which are relevant to a determination of blameworthiness," ' rather than the conclusions and classifications of experts. Psychiatric experts have therefore been discouraged from stating a simple conclusion as to whether an illeged crime was.a product of a mental disease or defect where that determination is essential to a determination of insanity. "the kind of opinion you would give to a family which brought one of its members to your clinic and asked for your diagnosis of his mental condition and a description of how his condition would be likely to influence his conduct." 74 It has also been required that the charge to the jury admonish it against excessive reliance upon the expert's conclusions.
5
Conclusory psychiatric testimony has also been found to inhibit intelligent decision-making where civil commitment is authorized for the dangerous. In words that ring truer, perhaps, in this context than in that for which they were written, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has said:
It is particularly important that courts not allow this second question to devolve, by default, upon the expert witnesses. Psychiatrists should not be asked to testify, without more, simply whether future behavior or-threatened harm is "likely" to occur. For the psychiatrist "may-in his own mind-be defining 'likely' to mean anything from virtual certainty to slightly above chance. And his definition will not be a reflection of any expertise, but * * * of his own personal preference for safety or liberty."
Of course, psychiatrists may be unable or unwilling to provide a precise numerical estimate of probabilities, and we are not attempting to so limit their testimony. But questioning can and should bring out the expert witnes!'s meaning when he testifies that expected harm is or is not "likely." Only when this has been done can the court properly separate the factual question-what degree of likelihood exists in a particular case-from the legal one*-whether the degree of likelihood that has been found to exist provides a justification for commitment.
It is also significant that in the insanity defense context, the diagnosis of sociopath-once thought to imply too much rationality and too little compulsion to warrant mitigating treatment-is 'increasingly thought-to present a challenge to the presumption of responsibility which only the jury 74 Id at 458. The modification of the Washington rule in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) eliminates the prohibition of "ultimate fact" testimony, but in no way reflects a diminished concern that the proper role of the jury be maintained; under existing procedures, the court is to make it clear to the jury, by its instructions, that "[tihe experts add to perspective, without giving decision. The law looks to the experts for input, and to the jury for outcome." Id at 1007.
7
s See 471 F.2d at 1006-07. 78 Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d at 1100-01 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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may resolve. The Ninth Circuit has held, in a case involving testimony by a government witness that the defendant was a sociopath who could distinguish criminal and legal conduct, but could not "appreciate the morality of his conduct,, 77 that the trial judge committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury that " ... for purposes of the insanity defense, 'wrongfulness' means moral wrongfulness rather than criminal wrongfulness. "
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Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has held that the diagnosis that a defendant "is an Antisocial Personality and was so at the time of the alleged offenses, at which times he was able to appreciate the criminality of his act, but he was not able to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law," 79 is evidence which entitles the defendant to take the question of insanity to ajury. The patient did state that he felt that he was not able to control the actions leading up to the commission of this crime and although this is said with the same glib facile manner, nonetheless the staff is of the opinion that he is correct that the commission of these crimes is part and parcel of his sociopathic personality. He will so be reported to the Court. Id. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, the examining agency, had decided in 1957 "to treat sociopathic personality disturbance as a mental illness." United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1017 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Si United States v. Wilson, 399 F.2d 459, 463 (4th Cir. 1968 ). The evidence here was reminiscent of that typically presented in a Texas capital sentencing proceeding with, of course, conclusions of blameworthiness rather than dangerousness. Significantly, Judge Sobeloff said, dissenting from affirmance of the conviction and the jury determination that the defendant was not legally insane:
When psychiatrist and counsel fail to provide sufficient underlying information to the jury, the judge, I maintain, has some responsibility to help elicit this vital information. Although ours is indeed an adversary system, a criminal trial is not a game. It is a solemn proceeding in which moral judgment is pronounced. As the governor of the trial, and not a mere moderator, the judge has an affirmative duty to do all that is feasible to assure that these judgments are based upon all the relevant evidence. The opinions affirming convictions of diagnosed sociopaths occasionally have expressed, however indijudge should not hesitate to prevent the distortion of the jury's perspective by counsel's deficient exploration of the underlying, determinative facts. In some cases, the court may feel obligated to suggest that additional witnesses be called. At the very least it should ensure that the psychiatrists who do testify describe the investigations, observations, reasoning and medical theory which led to the ultimate opinion, as voiced on the witness stand. Professor McCormick has declared that the "core" of the opinion evidence rule would be preserved by a rule "prescribing that the trial judge in his discretion may require that a witness before giving testimony in terms of inference on general description shall first give the concrete details upon which the inference or description is founded, so far as feasible." The need for judicial supervision is particularly urgent in insanity cases, where the adversary system may malfunction because of the inexperience of counsel, the complexity of the issue, or both. Most criminal defendants are represented by court-appointed lawyers with little experience in criminal law or even other areas of trial work. These lawyers must master new fields of law and new skills. When, in addition, it becomes their task to present a defense of insanity, which involves elusive medical, legal and moral problems,.they are often understandably overwhelmed. In these circumstances, intervention from the bench may be absolutely essential for a fair trial.
In the instant case, the trial judge did play more than a passive role. On several occasions he commendably required the expert witness to clarify his opinions. But he never demanded that the psychiatrist present the factual basis for his opinions. Thus the jury never obtained a complete unfolding of defendant's emotional and mental processes. If they had, they might have acquitted by reason of insanity. Id. at 465 (footnotes omitted). The opinion of the court further commented upon the "factual sparsity of the record," id. at 462, indicating that had the trial occurred after the more recent announcement of judicial rules for the presentation of psychiatric testimony on the issue of sanity, it would have remanded "for a retrial on the issue of mental responsibility." Id.
[Tihe expert witness was allowed and encouraged to state his conclusionary appraisal of the defendant. Conclusionary answers were given to questions which called for them and which, most frequently, were attempted to be cast in terms of ultimate inferences. 'Does the defendant know the difference between right and wrong?' 'Has he the capacity to refrain from doing what he wants to do if he wants very much to do it?' These are summary paraphrases of a barrage of questions that ultimately elicited in considerable detail the psychiatrist's summary description of the defendant. No one, however, asked the witness about the bases of hisjudgment.... The deficiencies of the record here seemingly result from an elementary preference for the unexamined
rectly, a mix of reservations about the verdict and speculation that it was dictated by the form of the legal test or of the expert testimony.
2
There is at least one case of acquittal despite a finding of sociopathy:
The report of the psychiatrist representing the court was, with the consent of the prosecution and the defense, admitted into evidence. In it he said, "On the basis of the existing Maryland law, this patient must be considered a responsible agent, since he has the capacity to distinguish right from wrong and to realize the consequences of his act. Yet, he has not even the ability to conform to society's demands that many insane individuals possess."
The defense psychiatrists all maintained that he did not know right from wrong. Following somewhat the line of reasoning of Jerome Hall, a distinguished American law professor, they asserted that knowing did not denote intellectual cognition alone but included an ability to make use of such knowledge. Being greatly affected by the tragedy of the youth's aged parents and having the court's assurance in answer to a specific question of the foreman that on no condition would he be at large to prey upon the community, the jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity. This was the first instance in Maryland law in which a psychopath was found not guilty by reason of insanity. As such, it attracted attention even outside the state. The Baltimore Sun called it a victory for the common sense of the jury in that it disregarded the "peculiarly backward definition of insanity" under Maryland law and brought "the definition into full accord with the latest findings of psychiatry.
' " conclusions of the expert witness over their factual predicates. It was only by happenstance that the witness testified that there was very little violence in Wilson's history, and the paucity of other basic information is proclaimed by the fact that we know nothing else about him except that he was forty-six years old, white and divorced. The doctor testified that Wilson had been a failure in everything he ever attempted, but the jury and we know nothing of anything Wilson ever attempted except marriage, and that is entirely unelucidated.
Id.
8 See note 81 supra; Apgar v. United States, 440 F.2d 733, 734 (8th Cir. 1971 ) ("we feel compelled to say that ... [the defendant's] life ... demonstrates the tragically inadequate response of our institutions-mental, penal and judicial-to an individual whose acts, time and again, constituted a plea for assistance to overcome severe personal inadequacies"); Adams v. United States, 413 F.2d 411, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1969 ) ('whatever evil may be, it is uncommonly difficult to discover it in the squalid life of this man").
83 M. GU'I-MACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 47, at 98-99.
And, the McCords have reported a case in which the Governor of Maryland, "question[ing] the validity of sentencing a man because of a prediction concerning his peril to society," 4 commuted the sentence of a sociopath condemned to die.ss Two conclusions may be drawn from these cases involving similar decisionmaking or similarly diagnosed criminal defendants. The first is that a fair hearing on a question which involves a measurement of culpability requires that the factfinder be given all "data relevant to blameworthiness" s and bolstered against reliance upon conclusory expert testimony which fosters the delegation of its role to the psychiatric expert. The second is that the very diagnosis which has led to the condemnation of Texas capital defendants may be deemed mitigating where decisions are free of rigid formulae (sociopath = not psychotic = able to distinguish right and wrong = able to conform to the requirements of law) and decisionmakers are able to see the data, and the individual, behind the labels. Texas has traditionally thought sentencing judgments best made byjuries.8 7 It has, moreover, been on guard lest the proper role of the jury be usurped by psychiatric experts 
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The sentencing judge had said: [The defendant] is a mentally abnormal person, and I knew him to be so when I sentenced him to hauig. There is something very ugly about that bald statement. Even a judge who believes in capital punishment would hesitate a long time before he imposed the death sentence upon a person known to be mentally irresponsible. I do not believe in caiital punishment ... society confesses its own failure every time it exacts a life for a life. Id. at 174.
The Governor (Albert C. Ritchie) had this response: What I cannot understand is how the Court could first decide-as it did-that [the defendant's] mental disorder should be considered in mitigation of punishment, and that he should not be hanged; and then sentence him to be hanged anyhow, not for his crime, but because the penitentiary is the only place to which he could be committed.
Id.
The McCords themselves said, of the execution of sociopaths, that "[s]ince execution precludes the possibility of better treatment, spontaneous 'conversion,' or correcting mistaken diagnoses, it hardly seems ajust solution to society's problem." Id. at 188-89.
' Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d at 447. 
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